|
| hannibal
and the second punic war |
Date:
Sun, 11 Feb 1996
From:
Thompson
Subject:
INQ: 3 Questions on Punic War II
I
am reading :"Hannibal" by Ernle Bradford. I am listening
to it unabridged on tape, so I don't have access to any index, maps,
or statistics that may be included with this work. Without an index,
it's difficult to go back to see if I have missed something
important. I would appreciate any professional or amateur
historian's views on the following questions I have about the
above-mentioned work:
1)
I would like to know the population of Rome (the city itself) during
the time Hannibal's army was in Italy.
2) Bradford repeatedly mentions Hannibal's lack of a "siege
train" with which to attack Rome. Why was he not able to
procure this during the time he was in Italy, and would having this
siege train have allowed him to subdue the city (in your opinion, I
understand :-).
3) I recently read Barbara Tuchman's "A Distant Mirror" in
which she says that when medieval sources give statistics, (esp.
mortality statistics), they should be taken figuratively. If the
source says, "50,000 people died of the plague in Such-and-Such
city", we should take it as a very large proportion died, but
not necessarily 50,000 because they did not reckon statistics the
way we do. So......Re: Battle at Cannae. Are Livy (Polybius')
statistics reliable? Did 50,000-75,000 Romans really die or is this
figurative also? In other words, are ancient Roman sources reliable
statistically?
Date:
Mon, 12 Feb 1996
From:
Jean-Michel David
Subject:
Re: INQ: 3 Questions on Punic War II
On
considere generalement que la population de Rome au moment de la
deuxieme guerre punique atteignait les 200 000 personnes ou un peu
plus. La question du materiel de siege d'Hannibal est une fausse
question. Hannibal avait d'autres raisons pour ne pas se lancer dans
cette aventure : la duree d'un siege, l'eloignement de ses bases de
Campanie. Les chiffres que nous avons de cette epoque sont tres
incertains. Malgr© tout Cannes fut une tres grande defaite qui
entraina la destruction de plusieurs legions et corps d'allies et
donc de plusieurs dizaines de milliers d'hommes. Bien a vous JM
David
Date:
Wed, 14 Feb 1996
From:
David Meadows
Subject:
3 Questions on Punic War II
Boy ... I would have thought that people would be all over these
questions by now, but I guess it's exam time and all, so in the calm
before the marking storm I'll take a `professional' stab at it (on
list; I'm sure others are interested in such questions):
>1) I would like to know the population of Rome (the city itself)
during the >time Hannibal's army was in Italy.
Livy
gives a number of census figures throughout his work as do numerous
other folks and, the census of 234/3 lists there as being 270,713
Roman citizens -- this would be the adult males; when you add
females, kiddies, and slaves (probably not numerous yet), you
probably get a city of 3/4 of a million. Half way through the war
with Hannibal, in 209/8, the number of citizens dropped to 237,108
(some manuscripts have 137,108, but that is too big a drop, even
considering the damage Hannibal inflicted; probably a mistake by a
scribe). More info on this sort of thing can be found in Brunt's
*Italian Manpower*, although many of his figures are possibly a bit
high for many scholars' liking.
>2)
Bradford repeatedly mentions Hannibal's lack of a "siege train"
with >which to attack Rome. Why was he not able to procure this
during the time he >was in Italy, and would having this siege
train have allowed him to subdue >the city (in your opinion, I
understand :-).
Don't
need an opinion; the facts will do -- a siege train is not just
equipment, but also men to tend to that equipment, dig ditches, and
the like. When Hannibal initially invaded Italy, he had hoped that
numerous Italian cities would be more than happy to throw off the
yoke of Roman oppression; unfortunately for him, the Confederacy
held pretty solidly, except for a handful of Greek cities in the
south after Cannae. The problem with those Greek cities, though, was
that they had relied on Rome for protection for years and when they
decided to defect to Hannibal, they really weren't skilled soldiers
and they don't seem to have had the nerve to take part in a siege of
a major city -- the logistics of besieging a city like Rome must
have been very daunting (which is probably why Hannibal didn't do it
-- I don't think Bradford catches on to this). The walled city
itself would have been just the core; there would have been a
considerable population living outside the walls -- it's very
difficult to bring siege equipment to bear against the walls of a
city if you have to wade (figuratively speaking) through blocks of
houses and urban sprawl in general.
Did 50,000-75,000 Romans really die or is this figurative also? >In
other words, are ancient Roman sources reliable statistically?
It
strikes me that a very large number *did* die at Cannae -- the
sources are Roman and there really is no glory in inflating the
number of people the `home' side lost; more common is to inflate the
number you yourself killed or were up against. As for the specific
figures, they are suspiciously round (cf. the census figures, which
do not end in 000) -- Livy and Polybius are probably guessing and
are probably guessing on the basis of how many legions were present
and how many people survived. It seems a reasonable range for a
major disaster.
Date:
Thu, 15 Feb 1996
From:
"A.Keen"
Subject:
Re: 3 Questions on Punic War
> the logistics of besieging a city like Rome must have been >
very daunting (which is probably why Hannibal didn't do it >
I don't think Bradford catches on to this Not only can he not take
Rome, of course, but he can also do nothing about the colonies; as a
result, once the Romans decided not to fight him in set battles any
more, they could operate against his allies and retire within
fortified positions whenever he came near.
Date:
Fri, 16 Feb 1996
From:
David Meadows
Subject: Re: 3 Questions on Punic War II
The beauty of Fabius' strategy, of course, was that it, in effect,
created a siege of *Hannibal's* army ... sure Hannibal was free to
move about, but he didn't have control of the battlefield ... I
don't think Bradford (or many other commentators on PWII) catch on
to the importance of that from a strategic point of view.
Date:
Thu, 15 Feb 1996
From: Chris
Subject: Re: 3 Questions on Punic War II
with regard to statistics, perhaps its worth mentioning that
medieval copyists were quite capable of fouling the numbers up...was
that a IIII or an M? chris
Date:
Fri, 16 Feb 1996
From:
Nick Nicastro
Subject:
Fabius Schmabius
Fabius' strategy may have preserved the Roman army, and assured the
loyalty of allies and colonies, but it did nothing to preserve the
ultimate source of Roman power-- the land (or more specifically, the
farmland). Basically, Fabius' strategy was the equivalent of
barricading oneself in the bedroom while a burglar is free to
ransack the house... I'm sure someone has already said this, but
Fabius strategy didn't defeat Hannibal. Timely victories over
relieving forces from Spain, along with lack of support from
Carthage, assured that.
From: "A.Keen"
Subject:
Re: Fabius Schmabius
Basically,
Fabius' strategy was the > equivalent of barricading oneself in
the bedroom while a > burglar is free to ransack the house...
Which
when you know the burglar is going to beat the **** out of you given
the chance is not such a bad idea, actually.
>
I'm sure someone has already said this, but Fabius > strategy
didn't defeat Hannibal. Timely victories over > relieving forces
from Spain, along with lack of support > from Carthage, assured
that.
Fabius
might not have defeated Hannibal, but he prevented Hannibal's
victory. Hannibal's strategy was to force Rome into high-profile
engagements, defeat them, and hence demonstrate that Rome could not
protect its allies -- result, Rome's allies desert her, and Rome is
rendered incapable of threatening Carthage. But this would only work
if the Romans played too. Fabius' strategy denied a quick victory to
Hannibal, and Rome was able to show that Hannibal was unable to
effectively protect those Italians who did join them. The Punic War
was won in Spain, but it could have been lost in Italy -- though by
the time Hasdrubal arrived it was too late; Carthaginian victory at
the Metaurus might have prolonged the war, but it wouldn't have won
it. Also, "lack of support from Carthage" oversimplifies
-- as long as there was an active Roman presence in Spain it was
extremely risky to divert troops from there to march to Italy, which
is why it wasn't done until the situation was starting to look
desperate (and Hasdrubal's march to Italy gave Scipio an easier time
in Spain), and reinforcing Hannibal by sea was more or less
impossible, since Rome dominated the Mediterranean.
Date:
Fri, 16 Feb 1996
From:
Nick Nicastro
Subject:
Re: Fabius Schmabius
Of
course, my last post oversimplified. But hindsight is always 20/20,
and it is always intriguing to wonder what would have happened if
Hannibal had had a few more victories, and a few more years, to
consolidate himself in Italy. Yes, victory at the Metaurus River
would not have won the war by itself-- but it might have given
Hannibal the security, manpower and equipment to mount direct seiges
of allied Roman towns. Only a few of those *might* have shaken a few
more allies loose, which *might* have helped tip the balance in
Hannibal's direction, which *might* have encouraged Rome to make an
honorable peace that preserved some part of the Carthaginian empire.
I agree, however, that without a coordinated effort at sea the
Carthaginians would not have had a chance for ultimate victory. All
these possibilities are what make this war particularly interesting,
no matter how some authorities try to make it a foregone
conclusion.
Date:
Sat, 17 Feb 1996
From:
David Meadows
Subject:
Re: Fabius Schmabius
Basically,
Fabius' strategy was the equivalent of barricading >oneself in
the bedroom while a burglar is free to ransack the house...
To judge from the sources, the Romans had determined from the
beginning to fight the Carthaginians pretty much in Spain and Africa
-- the consuls for 218 had been assigned to Spain and Africa/Sicily
before Hannibal had even crossed the Ebro. The Romans clearly did
not feel their own territory was threatened and Livy makes it clear
that Hannibal basically beat them to the punch when it came to
entering Italy. Of course, the Romans would think their own superior
manpower would win the day, but it didn't, especially against
someone who was using tactics which the Romans weren't accustomed to
an whose soldiers had a couple of decades' worth of real fighting
behind them. Trebia, Trasimene, and Cannae were all a failure to the
Romans because they were relying on `traditional' tactics. It took
very unconventional thinking to prevent another Cannae from wiping
out the rest of Rome's upper classes (and footsoldiers) -- For that
Fabius must be credited. As for being the equivalent of barricading
in the bedroom ... well, that's a cute analogy but it has nothing to
do with Fabius' thinking. I personally believe that Fabius was
following the methods which Pericles had used in the early years of
the Peloponnesian war -- bring the people into the city and rely on
the allies to keep one supplied. Operations in Spain and elsewhere
were already under way. But Fabius had an advantage which Pericles
didn't ... he had hundreds of towns and a very large square mileage
that he could rely on. Hannibal can only cover so much ground -- at
any one time it's really only going to be one person barricaded in
their room while life is pretty normal in the other rooms of the
house. But it goes further, while that someone is there, pounding on
the door, you've got your own troops running up and down the halls
taking a slice here, poking an eye there. Unconventional thinking ..
that's what wins the big wars. >I'm sure someone has already said
this, but Fabius strategy didn't defeat >Hannibal. Timely
victories over relieving forces from Spain, along with >lack of
support from Carthage, assured that. Fabius' strategy was part of
the overall strategy which defeated Carthage; but Fabius did defeat
Hannibal -- Hannibal's lack of success in Italy must be viewed as a
major defeat, especially since he seems to have been such a talented
general.
Date:
Mon, 19 Feb 1996
From:
Nick Nicastro
Subject: Fabius Schmabius II
Again,
hindsight is usually pretty sharp. The reality was probably much
more interesting-- for instance, it was certainly due to blind luck
(and not a Roman fleet) that a Punic flotilla of reinforcements and
supplies was lost in a storm in 205. Also, you're forgetting that
Rome was able to forestall Macedonian intervention in the war (on
the side of Hannibal, that is) by organizing a native Greek
resistance league that preoccupied the Macedonians until it was too
late. Neither of these things, which to varying degrees might have
affected the outcome of the war, had anything to do with Fabius'
Italian strategy.
> I personally >believe that Fabius was following the methods
which Pericles had used in the >early years of the Peloponnesian
war -- bring the people into the city and >rely on the allies to
keep one supplied.
If this was in Fabius' mind, it's an odd choice considering the
ultimate result of Pericles' strategy! .
Date:
Mon, 19 Feb 1996
From:
David Meadows
Subject:
Re: Fabius Schmabius II
Again,
hindsight is usually pretty sharp. This isn't hindsight ... The
reality was probably much >more interesting-- for instance, it
was certainly due to blind luck (and >not a Roman fleet) that a
Punic flotilla of reinforcements and supplies was >lost in a
storm in 205.
Luck
often works its way into campaigns, but it rarely -- if ever --
decides them. One could say that Hannibal's little ruse with the
cattle succeeded only because of "blind luck"; had Fabius
not bought into it, Cannae probably would not have happened and
Hannibal would have been stopped early. But this, as much as the
impact of the Punic flotilla belong in the realm of "history
what if?", not "history, what actually happened". You
also seem to be ignoring the fact that the Romans in Italy did
manage to deal with reinforcements -- in 206 Mago received
reinforcements from Carthage, along with some members of the Boii --
Rome handled them. They had no qualms about fighting other
commanders; it was Hannibal they decided not to fight (note the
success the Romans had in the year after Cannae against other
Carthaginian commanders in the south).
Also,
you're forgetting that Rome was able to >forestall Macedonian
intervention in the war (on the side of Hannibal, that >is) by
organizing a native Greek resistance league that preoccupied the >Macedonians
until it was too late. Neither of these things, which to >varying
degrees might have affected the outcome of the war, had anything to
>do with Fabius' Italian strategy.
I'm not forgetting that at all -- I've been trying to make the
distinction between defeating Hannibal and defeating Carthage.
Fabius was the person who was directly dealing with Hannibal. What
Philip, despite his alliance, was doing in Greece had nothing to do
with Fabius' strategy, save perhaps in hurting it by reducing the
number of troops at his immediate disposal to follow Hannibal
around. But it was also Fabius (I believe ... I can't find my Livy
at the moment) who did all the disposition of troops in 215 which
resulted in the victory at Nola, and also sent Laevinius to deal
with Philip
>He
went on: > >> I personally >>believe that Fabius was
following the methods which Pericles had used in the >>early
years of the Peloponnesian war -- bring the people into the city and
>>rely on the allies to keep one supplied. > >If this
was in Fabius' mind, it's an odd choice considering the ultimate >result
of Pericles' strategy!
Why
is it `lucky' that a punic flotilla was lost but not similarly
`unlucky' that Athens was hit by the plague? Had there been no
plague, the Athenians might have had success. I'm sorry if my words
come across so harshly -- they aren't intended to. I'm similarly
sorry if I engage in what seems to be post hoc rationalization. But
considering my place in time I can *only* engage in such things -- I
am not engaging in post hoc ergo propter hoc rationalization
however, and just to make clear what I am saying, Fabius' strategy
defeated hannibal insofar as Hannibal did not achieve his objective.
Fabius' strategy did not defeat *Carthage*, but it did *contribute*
to that defeat. dm
Date:
Mon, 19 Feb 1996
From:
Nick Nicastro
Subject:
The Last of Fabius Schmabius
Yes,
I agree the distinction between defeating Hannibal and defeating
Carthage is a useful one in understanding Roman strategy in PWII.
While the capacity of Carthage and her other commanders to defeat
Rome was close to nil (due both to military and economic factors),
through his own efforts Hannibal did put himself in a defining
position. And yes, luck "rarely decides campaigns."-- but
it does have a role. The joining of Hannibal and Hasdrubal would
have had enormous strategic effect on the war in Italy, and part of
the reason it didn't happen was a fortuitous interception of
intelligence by the Romans, who were able to locate Hasdrubal early
and defeat him before he met up with his brother. Yes, luck favors
the prepared-- and Fabius's strategy was a sound one insofar as Rome
couldn't defeat Hannibal-- and Rome's capacity to fight on several
fronts was decisive-- but I just wanted to underline how much of a
close-run thing this war was.
P.S. Mago invaded what is now Genoa, I believe. I don't know why he
didn't join forces with Hannibal in Bruttium, but he might have made
more of an impact if he had.
Date:
Mon, 19 Feb 1996
From:
John Murphy
Subject: Re: Fabius Schmabius II
>Also,
you're forgetting that Rome was able to >forestall Macedonian
intervention in the war (on the side of Hannibal, that >is) by
organizing a native Greek resistance league that preoccupied the >Macedonians
until it was too late.
I
think this is not quite correct. I don't have any sources at hand
but first of all I think the Greek resistance to Macedon had little
to do with Rome until Cynoscephalae, after which Rome in her typical
manner organized an allied league of Greek states dedicated to
preserving their independence from Macedon. Second, and my memory
may be playing tricks on me, didn't Philip V have an army ready to
make the crossing of the Adriatic?
>If
this was in Fabius' mind, it's an odd choice considering the
ultimate >result of Pericles' strategy!
If
you mean the plague, possibly although who could foresee or plan for
an event like that. If you mean losing the war, Pericles' strategy
had NOTHING to do with that. In fact, while Pericles sat behind the
walls the Athenian navy was running rampant terrorizing the
Peloponnesian (did I spell it right?) coast line. This in turn was
giving Sparta's allied neighbors fits whereas Sparta could really do
very little in return. Athens lost the war because they first gave
up this strategy after Pericles death and then foolishly decided to
take on another enemy as powerful as Sparta when they attacked
Syracuse.
Date:
Mon, 19 Feb 1996
From:
"p.d. snider"
Subject:
Hannibal Schannibal
Sorry, I couldn't resist the provocative title :). Besides, I
thought it might be worthwhile turning the discussion on its head.
Instead of trying to find the shortcomings of the Fabian strategy or
defending that strategy, it is worthwhile thinking about Hannibal's
strategy, its shortcomings and, then, we can look at why Fabius'
strategy worked. I would suggest that Hannibal's strategy in
invading Italy was based upon a basic strategic misconception. He
assumed that Rome's control in Italy would collapse if Rome should
be dealt a few really nasty defeats. Well, he did that and Rome's
allies in Italy did not fall away, for the most part. Clearly,
Hannibal did not recognize how far the Romans had managed to
consolidate their power in Italy. Perhaps Hannibal's tactics would
have worked in the First Punic War, but the Romans consolidated
their power considerably in the interwar period. As a result,
Hannibal made a strategic mistake on the same plane as Hitler's
mistake in believing Russia would be a pushover. Now, I can see
someone objecting, that, after Cannae, we do see allies fall away.
Yes, we do and in a perverse way, this actually proves my point.
Sooner or later, given enough hammer-blows, Hannibal could still
have created dissension anong the allies. The aftermath of Cannae
proves that. This is where the Fabian strategy was the perfect
solution to the situation. Hannibal clearly was a tactical genius
and there was no Roman commander, save perhaps Scipio Africanus, who
could take him in pitched battle. The Battles on the Arno, Lake
Trasimene and Cannae proved that abundantly. So, Fabius refused
battle. By itself, that would be cowardice and passivity. However,
instead, he dogged Hannibal to prevent him from establishing a base
without the inescusable risk of allowing the Carthaginian army to be
besieged, cut off from any relief. David Meadows image of a
perambulating siege is an apt one and lays at the center of the
Fabian strategy, which was to contain the threat. As David points
out, the war was won in Spain, but it could have been lost in Italy.
Lastly, let's do a simple cost-benefit analysis. For Carthage, what
would the loss of Hannibal's army mean? The weakening of Spanish
defences? By his very act of invading Italy, Hannibal diverted
forces from Spain, and arguably made it easier to capture. What
could she gain? A fatal disruption of Rome's power. Fair enough. For
Rome, what would she gain by confronting Hannibal? The destruction
of an army which was tying down considerable forces. Okay, that's
good. But keep in mind that the invasion of Africa was made at the
same time as Hannibal's tramping through Italy. Obviously, after
Spain was subjected, Rome had enough forces to contain Hannibal and
launch an offensive. What would be the cost of defeat? Another knock
at Roman prestege and, ultimately, the undermining of her unusually
loyal allies. My point is that Hannibal drastically underestimated
the loyalty of Rome's allies, but he could still have won his point
by continuing to knock the Romans around. Fabius' containment policy
prevented these knocks at Roman prestege and prevented the likely
result: the defection of the allies.
Date:
Tue, 20 Feb 1996
From:
"A.Keen"
Subject:
Re: Fabius Schmabius II
Second, and my memory may be playing tricks on me, didn't >
Philip V have an army ready to make the crossing of the >
Adriatic?
No,
this isn't right -- Rome was allied to the anti-Macedonian Aetolians
fifteen years before Cynoscephalae. On the other hand Nick
Nicastro's interpretation of Rome's distracting Macedon until it was
"too late" is disingenuous, since if any one can be said
to have "won" the First Macedonian War it was Philip, not
Rome.
From:
David Meadows
Subject:
Re: Hannibal Schannibal
Something I've never quite been able to figure out about Hannibal is
why he never managed to convince the Gauls to join his fight in a
major way, especially after the `big three' -- there was that big
thwarted invasion just prior to PWII, and the Boii and Insubres seem
to have been involved in 218 -- then we don't really hear of any
significant Gallic involvement in Italy until the turn of the second
century. Perhaps the Gauls were too undisciplined for Hannibal's
liking? Or did Hannibal think he had enough men of his own (why
didn't he get Philip to provide him with mercenaries?). And another
thing: why did he stay in Italy for so long at all? Sure, he might
initially have figured he'd get some allies, but after five or so
years it *must* have dawned on him that that wasn't going to happen.
Why didn't he hit Italy in the old breadbasket and move his
operations to Sicily (where the Romans would be forced to deal with
him)?
Date:
Tue, 20 Feb 1996
From:
Javier Fuldain Gonzalez
Subject:
Re: Fabius Schmabius II
If
you mean losing the war, Pericles' strategy had NOTHING to do with
that. In fact, while Pericles sat behind the walls the Athenian navy
was running rampant terrorizing the Peloponnesian coast line. This
in turn was giving Sparta's allied neighbors fits whereas Sparta
could really do very little in return. Athens lost the war because
they first gave up this strategy after Pericles death and then
foolishly decided to take on another enemy as powerful as Sparta
when they attacked Syracuse.
I
am not so sure about the success of Pericles strategy. Of course,
Pericles died in the second year of the war, and the war was quite
balanced at that time, but i think his strategy was followed until
the Nicias Peace. And I think the first strong hit against Athens
was the Brasidas one, especially, Anfipolis. Brasidas showed the
weakness of the athenian empire. At Nicias Peace there was no
winner. Sparta had lost his prestige, but Athenas lost Anfipolis,
that was the result of Pericles strategy. Sparta recovered his
prestige after the battle at Mantinea. What about Athenas and An
fipolis? On the other hand, is easy now (2.000 years later)
recognice that the whol e war as one war. But the athenians were in
peace with peloponnesians when decided the sicilian expedition. The
war was over, and athens was back to his natural politics, empire
and expansion.
Date:
Tue, 20 Feb 1996
From:
Nick Nicastro
Subject:
Reply to Murphy
Second,
and my memory may be playing tricks on me, didn't >Philip V have
an army ready to make the crossing of the Adriatic?
Actually,
I have checked the sources. Philip did have a mind to intervene, but
was distracted by the strategy to which I alluded. To my flip
remark--
>>If
this was in Fabius' mind, it's an odd choice considering the
ultimate >>result of Pericles' strategy! Murphy goes on--
>
>If you mean the plague, possibly although who could foresee or
plan for an >event like that. If you mean losing the war,
Pericles' strategy had NOTHING >to do with that.
Actually,
my comment was meant more as a joke-- though, imagining the scene, I
can't imagine the Senate derived much comfort from the prospect that
"we'll be just like Periclean Athens during the Peloponnesian
war"...
Date:
Tue, 20 Feb 1996
From:
David
Subject: Re: Fabius Schmabius II and Pericles
You
do Pericles' strategy a great disservice when you imply that it was
ultimately responsible for the loss of the Peloponnesian War. That
is simply not the case. What lost the Peloponnesian War was Athens'
NOT following Pericles' strategy, and overextending herself with
ill-conceived sorties that sapped her manpower and exposed her
weaknesses to the enemy as well as rebellious allies. The only thing
that beat the Athenians in the Peloponnesian War was the Athenians,
and even weakened by two plagues and the Sicilian Disaster, as
Thucydides reminds us, it took another eight years to exhaust
Athens. I don't want to truck in "if"s and "could've"s,
but it has to make you think. NB: Thucydides explicitly states that
the Athenians departed from Pericles' strategy, so it seems unfair
to blame a strategy abandoned while it was working for the loss of a
war.
Date: Wed, 21 Feb 1996
From:
Eric M Orlin
Subject: Hannibal's strategy
I think David Meadows raised an excellent point - why did Hannibal
stay in Italy so long, and in particualr why did he not invade
Sicily?? Given the importance of Sicilian grain and given that
Carthage had held the Western part of the island for many more than
the 20 years (the period which Rome had controlled them) this would
seem to have been a logical move. In fact, I would argue that this
was Hannibal's greatest strategic blunder. (The others might be
excused on the grounds that just because a strategy fails does not
mean it was a bad strategy.) The Romans seem to have been worried
about this possibility - witness their decision to strengthen their
links with Sicily by importing the Venus from Mt. Eryx in 217. The
only suggestion I can think of right now, before consulting the
sources, is that Carthaginian rule in Sicily was not remembered
fondly. It is often said that Carthage lacked Rome's skill an
integrating the regions she conquered into her state, so perhaps
there was no love lost between the Sicilians and the Carthaginians.
This would certainly account for his failure to cross the straits,
but I don't know if there is any evidence to support this
conjecture. eric orlin --
Date:
Thu, 22 Feb 1996
From:
Matthias Bode
Subject: Re: Hannibal's strategy
What
is probably even more important: In order to get to Sicily he needed
SHIPS. The Carthagian Empire had lost some of it's sea power in the
process of becoming a land-power in Spain. Only in the desperate
need of the "Romani ante portas" in Carthago, the city
managed to get him back. Or did I miss something? By the way:
Hannibal and Fabius both practised a tactic which consisted mainly
of the destruction of the enemies infrastructure. Within a few
years, both had managed to destroy the Mezzogiorno back to the Stone
Age. (The region is improving since the middle of the 20th century
thanks to funds from the European Community). Hannibal did not have
the resources (manpower, food, wood) to stage an invasion of Sicily.
Date:
Thu, 22 Feb 1996
From:
"A.Keen"
Subject:
Hannibal's strategy
He
couldn't just wade across, you know. In order to get to Sicily he
need a port, in which he was constantly frustrated. Even if he had a
port, a long journey by sea would have exposed him to threats from
Rome's navy, so the ideal port would have been Rhegium. He did try;
Bruttium was brought over, and Rhegium was more-or-less isolated and
dependent upon support from Sicily. But it didn't fall.
>
The only suggestion I can think of right now, before > consulting
the sources, is that Carthaginian rule in Sicily > was not
remembered fondly. It is often said that Carthage > lacked Rome's
skill an integrating the regions she > conquered into her state,
so perhaps there was no love lost > between the Sicilians and the
Carthaginians. This would > certainly account for his failure to
cross the straits, > but I don't know if there is any evidence to
support this > conjecture.
Given
that Hiero of Syracuse revolted from Rome to join the Carthaginian
side, precipitating several years of hard struggle, I don't think
its true to say Sicily was inherently anti-Carthaginian.
Date:
Fri, 23 Feb 1996
From:
David Meadows
Subject:
Re: Hannibal's Error
While
I can't say that I disagree with most of what's written here, I
still wonder why Hannibal didn't hit Sicily. All he would need ships
for would be to get there. He wouldn't actually have to conduct
naval warfare -- you don't need ships to burn crops and ravage
country sides. I'm not sure what the level of slave labour was in
Sicily at the time (it might be a bit early for this), but he
possibly could have incited a slave revolt. On the other hand, the
Romans did commit a fair number of soldiers to the Sicilian theatre
from the start so crossing over (from Italy, at least) might not
have been in the realm of possibility at all -- but we are talking
about *Hannibal.*
Date:
Thu, 22 Feb 1996
From:
Nick Nicastro
Subject:
Hannibal and Sicily
This
would >certainly account for his failure to cross the straits,
but I don't >know if there is any evidence to support this
conjecture.
This
is an interesting point. As I wrote to Mr. Meadows, there may have
been additional reasons-- first, that the physical crossing of the
straits was not necessarily an easy thing, especially with a
prepared enemy that dominated the seas (witness the trouble, later,
when Octavian tried to dislodge Sextus Pompey from Sicily); second,
Hannibal may have wanted to preserve the option to *feint* an attack
on Rome itself, as he actually did when his brother Hasdrubal
entered Italy. An expedition to Sicily would have damaged Roman
economic and territorial interests, but it would also have taken the
immediate pressure off the capital.
Date:
Fri, 23 Feb 1996
From:
David Meadows
Subject: Re: Hannibal's strategy
>He
couldn't just wade across, you know. In order to get to Sicily he >need
a port, in which he was constantly frustrated.
Well
Capua or even Tarentum (the finest harbour in Italy) surely would
have done, no?
Date:
Sat, 24 Feb 1996
From:
"Fernando E. Lamas, M.D."
Subject:
Hannibal's Sicily strategy
Recent postings have explored the reasons why Hannibal did not
invade Sicily.The logistical difficulties resulting from the
inferiority of Carthaginian sea power at the time have been
stressed. I fully agree with the difficulties imposed by naval
inferiority. However, they do not explain why an attempt was not
even made if a commander of Hannibal's caliber should deem it
necessary. In later times, Caesar crossed the Adriatic in the face
of Pompeian naval superiority. In my opinion, Hannibal considered
Sicily a strategic dead-end that had been beaten to death during the
First Punic War. Vast amounts of Carthaginian resources had been
invested in Sicilian operations during that war with no final
victory to show for it. Hannibal's father, Hamilcar Barca, spent the
waning years of that war (247-243 B.C.)conducting inconclusive
guerilla raids from fortified strongholds that accomplished nothing
except to give Rome time to recover from earlier losses. During the
American Civil War,Grant realized that victory was not to be found
in capturing a geographic objective such as Richmond but, rather, in
bringing Lee's army to battle and breaking it's back. Hannibal had
the same strategy. In view of the incredible tenacity demonstrated
by Rome after defeats that would have vanquished lesser nations,
Hannibal knew that any hope of a final victory lay in another Cannae
on the Italian mainland. Final victory was not to be found by
investing limited resources in the Sicilian bottle that had trapped
his father.
Mon, 26 Feb 1996
From:
Julia Megan Rosalez
Subject:
Re: Hannibal's Error
While
I can't write fluently along the lines of Hannibal, slave labor was
at a very high level in Sicily - it began when the Greeks controlled
the island (officially admitted to anyway). Also, even though there
were Roman soldiers on the island, Sicily was only considered for
its value regarding wheat - the Romans did not rule the island with,
how shall I say, enthusiasm. Along the lines of military occupation,
there were really garrisons on the island and not large amounts of
troops. Afterall, the Romans acquired Sicily through a political and
military agreement, making the island the first Roman "province".
The people of the island were basically left on their own; the
Romans took no interest in island affairs unless the shipments of
wheat and tribute were disrupted in some way..
Date:
Wed, 28 Feb 1996
From: David Meadows
Subject:
Re: Hannibal's Error
>Also,
even though there were Roman soldiers on the island, Sicily was >only
considered for its value regarding wheat - the Romans did not rule >the
island with, how shall I say, enthusiasm. Along the lines of
military >occupation, there were really garrisons on the island
and not large >amounts of troops. Afterall, the Romans acquired
Sicily through a >political and military agreement, making the
island the first Roman >"province". The people of the
island were basically left on their own; >the Romans took no
interest in island affairs unless the shipments of >wheat and
tribute were disrupted in some way.
This
post tweaked something in the old noggin', so I was basically forced
to think a bit harder on this and when I took Peter Garnsey's Famine
and Food Supply off the shelf, I was pretty much forced to disagree
with myself. It would appear that Hannibal did not go for Sicily
because, at the time, there was no need to. Rome was not yet
dependent on Sicily as a supplier of grain .. Italy was still a
sufficient supplier. In the early phases of the war, Hiero of
Syracuse did make a number of contributions of grain to Rome as a
gift in response, apparently, to crises, but there does not appear
to have been a regular traffic of Sicilian grain to Rome yet --
apparently grain collected by taxes was pretty much consumed by the
garrison scattered over the island. The Syracuse connection is
important because most of the really productive land in Sicily was
apparently controlled by it. In 215, Hiero -- the long loyal ally of
Rome -- kicked the old krater and his grandson Hieronymus succeeded
him -- he was but a teenager, but perhaps most importantly for the
current discussion, he also switched sides. It was only after PWII
that Syracuse and Sicily in general were turned into a major tribute
paying province by which grain came not in the form of gifts but
annually as tribute. So the upshot is, Hannibal probably didn't feel
he *had* to go for Sicily, especially once Hiero was out of the
picture. And of course, after PWII, Rome had access to the grain of
Sicily, Africa, and was on friendly relations with Numidia (another
big time grain operation). What's interesting in all this, though,
is that even with Hannibal obviously ravaging the Italian
countryside, we don't hear of any shortages of grain in Rome except
in 211 -- Livy says nothing on this, but Appian and Polybius both
seem to refer to this year as being a year when there was a shortage
of grain in Rome (with the usual rise in prices -- no apparent
riots, though) primarily because there were wars in all parts of the
world where Rome might get grain from (the exception, apparently,
being Egypt, whence, presumably Rome managed to get some supplied).
After that, production in Italy apparently was still rather meagre
until they brought the Magna Mater to Rome, at which time Italy had
the greatest harvest it had in a long time (according to Pliny the
Elder). All this does, however, is reinforce my earlier statement
that Fabius' policy was basically an adaptation of Pericles'
strategy, only in Rome's case, it seems to have worked. She never
was completely cut off from her suppliers and while she does seem to
have been hit by epidemics of some sort (208, 205), it does not seem
to have affected those who were carrying out the strategy.
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