From Scholia:
Ingvild Saelid Gilhus, Animals, Gods and Humans: Changing Attitudes to Animals in Greek, Roman and Early Christian Ideas
From TLS:
David Mattingly, Imperial Possession
From H-German@h-net.msu.edu (June, 2006)
Geoffrey Parker, ed. _The Cambridge History of Warfare_. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005. viii + 524 pp. Illustrations, maps,
notes, bibliography, index. $22.99 (cloth), ISBN 0-521-61895-9.
Reviewed for H-German by Christopher Storrs, Department of
History, University of Dundee, United Kingdom.
How the West has Won
Essentially, this book comprises the text of the _Cambridge
Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumph of the West_ (1995),
without the illustrations, but updated to include wars fought since
that date. In seventeen chapters (plus an introduction and epilogue),
seven international experts in military history set out to consider
their subject from 600 BCE to the present. In fact, their scope is
narrower and more specific. It is to explain the rise to dominance of
what its authors understand as "the western way of war." This, Parker
claims, explains the dominance of European or western culture--more
than economic, intellectual and other factors. In his preface, Parker
confronts the charge leveled against the earlier work that his focus
is (too) Eurocentric. His defense against the charge has three
aspects. Firstly, Parker argues, it would be impossible to cover
adequately in a single volume the military history of all cultures.
Secondly, and following from this, it would be a distortion to
include some minor reference to the military traditions of those
non-European cultures while devoting the vast part of the text to the
European way of war. Third, and above all, the European way of war
has become the dominant military culture in the last two hundred
years. Either non-European states were conquered by that culture or
they were obliged to adopt it themselves to survive.
This claim, of course, raises the question: just how do we understand
this "western way" of war? According to Parker, it has five key
aspects or foundations. The first of these is the reliance on
technological superiority--generally as a means of compensating for
inferiority in numbers. Thus, starting with the Persian wars of the
fifth century BCE, the West was usually able to field men whose
(technological) fighting potential was superior to that of their
opponents. However, having the "technological edge" alone was rarely
enough to guarantee victory. This problem brings us to the Parker's
second factor--superior discipline and training, which often made up
for numerical weakness. Associated with this training was the fact
that western armies won their victories for the most part on the
basis of their infantry. Parker's third factor represents a
remarkable continuity in the western military tradition, or rather,
in military theory. Typically, Vegetius's compendium of Roman
military practice, _Concerning Military Matters_, compiled at the end
of the fourth century CE remained popular for more than 1,000 years:
George Washington owned--and read and annotated--a copy. In part in
consequence of this tradition, certain basic ideas have had a
remarkable longevity, including for example, a belief in the
desirability of decisive victory. Parker contrasts this attitude with
a non-western view of war which was less determined, less
destructive--and ultimately less successful. A fourth factor
emphasized by Parker relates to the existence in Europe of a
multiplicity of competing states. The struggle between them
apparently stimulated military innovation and improvement, according
to what has been called the "punctuated equilibrium" model. In this
model, short bursts of rapid change are separated by longer intervals
of slower improvement. Thus, in the fourteenth century, English
archers and Swiss pike men, or in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries, the so-called artillery fortress (those familiar with
Parker's work will recognize a hobby horse of his here) shattered the
prevailing equilibrium and provoked a phase of rapid adjustment and
transformation. However, the ability to respond to such challenges
rested on Parker's fifth factor: innovation--adopting new technology
and expanding armies and navies. Finding the typically enormous means
to pay for this expensive strategy enhanced the power of the state in
the West. Such power could provoke a negative reaction, but overall,
the challenge of war--if successfully met--increased the
effectiveness of the state. As Parker puts it, "states made war but
wars also made states" (p.8). But success in this respect
also depended in part upon the development of other instruments of
power, particularly the financial institutions which enabled states
to fund armies, including credit, which in turn required the
cooperation of those who supplied the credit or the means which
underpinned it. Long-term credit in wartime thus represented a
crucial "secret weapon" of the West. Not surprisingly, not all
western states stayed the course. Sweden, for example--an aggressive
and imperial power in the Baltic and north Germany in the seventeenth
century--dropped out of the race following its traumatic defeat in
the Great Northern War (1700-21). However, the West as a
block--Europe initially, subsequently joined by the United
States--had found the means, that is, the military culture, that
ensured "European'" domination of the world, and which was already
well advanced by the middle of the seventeenth century.
The rest of the book focuses on explaining these developments. Part
1, "The Age of Massed Infantry," covers the period from 600 BC to 300
AD, with chapters on the "Genesis of the Infantry, 600-350 BC" and
"The Roman Way of War 250 BC-AD 300'"; part 2, "The Age of Stone
Fortifications" (300-1500 AD) includes chapters on "New Weapons, New
Tactics 1300-1500" and "The Gunpowder Revolution 1300-1500"; part 3,
"The Age of Guns and Sails" covers the period 1500-1800/1815; and
part 4, "The Age of Mechanized Warfare" covers the period 1800-2004.
Thus, the book's coverage is extended beyond that of 1995 to include
most obviously the Al Qaeda attack on New York in September 2001,
President Bush's "war on terror"(which, curiously, given its
stretching of the nature and understanding of war, is not really
discussed), the attack on (or bombardment) of Afghanistan (2001) and
the invasion of Iraq (2003). The volume is completed by an epilogue
in which Parker briefly recapitulates the factors that distinguish
the Western way of war. He also explains the successes of this way of
war and seeks to divine future developments. Parker concludes that to
maintain its (military) dominance, the West must continue "to be
right" (p. 432). This difficult task is best done, he
argues, by imitating the traditions outlined and analyzed in this
volume, which thus is intended to function as something of a manual
for policy-makers (and their electorates?). Some additional material
is found in a chronology and in a glossary. Finally, there is a
helpful bibliography, which inevitably, however, can only scratch the
surface of the vast range of secondary literature which underpins
what is essentially a work of synthesis.
Parker has edited a very readable and interesting volume, one which
has already won widespread plaudits--for good reason. However (and
inevitably, given the ambitious attempt to cover the great sweep of
the history of war over two millennia in little more than 400 pages),
some anomalies and lacunae remain . Half of the book deals with the
2,000 years or so to 1800; the other half with the mere two hundred
years since. The nearer we get to the present day, the greater the
detail, some of which might have been sacrificed in favor of fuller
coverage of earlier periods. Thus the War of the Polish Succession
(1733-38), whose title perhaps belies its real scope and importance,
is omitted from both main text and chronology. The War of Bavarian
Succession (1778-79), and the rather more important Russo-Austrian
war in the Balkans against the Ottoman empire (1787-92), are also
missing. As for the twentieth century, the Spanish Civil War is
covered very cursorily, and nothing is said about the destruction of
Guernica by the Condor Legion, although it might be thought to have
deserved mention as representing the testing of some of the new
thinking about the use of airpower in war. Curiously, too, the
concept of _Blitzkrieg_ is nowhere mentioned. The volume also
occasionally seems to be shy of engaging with influential theorists
of war. The important early-nineteenth-century Prussian military
thinker, Carl von Clausewitz, who meditated on the recent experience
of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (and on much more)
and whose work is said to have influenced United States' commanders
in the 1980s, is mentioned, but surely merited fuller discussion.
Inevitably, individual readers will sometimes disagree with some of
the interpretation. Were dynastic issues really less dominant in
justifying war after 1640? The designation of various conflicts in
the succeeding hundred years as wars of (Spanish, Polish, Austrian)
succession may be overdone but there was some point to these labels.
Last, but by no means least, given the attention devoted to
contemporary conflicts (notably the second Iraq war), and the lack of
consensus about their justification, some will think the account,
evenhanded and objective as it clearly seeks to be, insufficiently
critical of the leaders who took their states to war.
Some readers will want more on their particular period, or war, or
aspect of military (or naval) history, and less on others.
Nevertheless, Parker and his collaborators have produced an
impressive and immensely useful survey, within which are
invaluable--not least because they are concise, clearly written and
very readable--surveys of major conflicts. In addition, the
contributions of the various authors are made to fit into a coherent
overall pattern or thesis. The volume will no doubt--and deserves
to--find a large market among those seeking among other things to set
recent conflicts, and developments in the ways of war, into
historical context.
Copyright 2006 by H-Net, all rights reserved. H-Net permits the
redistribution and reprinting of this work for nonprofit, educational
purposes, with full and accurate attribution to the author, web
location, date of publication, originating list, and H-Net: Humanities &
Social Sciences Online. For any other proposed use, contact the Reviews
editorial staff at hbooks@mail.h-net.msu.edu.
We also note that Arethusa 39.3 has hit Project Muse with a special issue on Ennius and the Invention of Roman Epic ....
Ingvild Saelid Gilhus, Animals, Gods and Humans: Changing Attitudes to Animals in Greek, Roman and Early Christian Ideas
From TLS:
David Mattingly, Imperial Possession
From H-German@h-net.msu.edu (June, 2006)
Geoffrey Parker, ed. _The Cambridge History of Warfare_. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005. viii + 524 pp. Illustrations, maps,
notes, bibliography, index. $22.99 (cloth), ISBN 0-521-61895-9.
Reviewed for H-German by Christopher Storrs, Department of
History, University of Dundee, United Kingdom.
How the West has Won
Essentially, this book comprises the text of the _Cambridge
Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumph of the West_ (1995),
without the illustrations, but updated to include wars fought since
that date. In seventeen chapters (plus an introduction and epilogue),
seven international experts in military history set out to consider
their subject from 600 BCE to the present. In fact, their scope is
narrower and more specific. It is to explain the rise to dominance of
what its authors understand as "the western way of war." This, Parker
claims, explains the dominance of European or western culture--more
than economic, intellectual and other factors. In his preface, Parker
confronts the charge leveled against the earlier work that his focus
is (too) Eurocentric. His defense against the charge has three
aspects. Firstly, Parker argues, it would be impossible to cover
adequately in a single volume the military history of all cultures.
Secondly, and following from this, it would be a distortion to
include some minor reference to the military traditions of those
non-European cultures while devoting the vast part of the text to the
European way of war. Third, and above all, the European way of war
has become the dominant military culture in the last two hundred
years. Either non-European states were conquered by that culture or
they were obliged to adopt it themselves to survive.
This claim, of course, raises the question: just how do we understand
this "western way" of war? According to Parker, it has five key
aspects or foundations. The first of these is the reliance on
technological superiority--generally as a means of compensating for
inferiority in numbers. Thus, starting with the Persian wars of the
fifth century BCE, the West was usually able to field men whose
(technological) fighting potential was superior to that of their
opponents. However, having the "technological edge" alone was rarely
enough to guarantee victory. This problem brings us to the Parker's
second factor--superior discipline and training, which often made up
for numerical weakness. Associated with this training was the fact
that western armies won their victories for the most part on the
basis of their infantry. Parker's third factor represents a
remarkable continuity in the western military tradition, or rather,
in military theory. Typically, Vegetius's compendium of Roman
military practice, _Concerning Military Matters_, compiled at the end
of the fourth century CE remained popular for more than 1,000 years:
George Washington owned--and read and annotated--a copy. In part in
consequence of this tradition, certain basic ideas have had a
remarkable longevity, including for example, a belief in the
desirability of decisive victory. Parker contrasts this attitude with
a non-western view of war which was less determined, less
destructive--and ultimately less successful. A fourth factor
emphasized by Parker relates to the existence in Europe of a
multiplicity of competing states. The struggle between them
apparently stimulated military innovation and improvement, according
to what has been called the "punctuated equilibrium" model. In this
model, short bursts of rapid change are separated by longer intervals
of slower improvement. Thus, in the fourteenth century, English
archers and Swiss pike men, or in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries, the so-called artillery fortress (those familiar with
Parker's work will recognize a hobby horse of his here) shattered the
prevailing equilibrium and provoked a phase of rapid adjustment and
transformation. However, the ability to respond to such challenges
rested on Parker's fifth factor: innovation--adopting new technology
and expanding armies and navies. Finding the typically enormous means
to pay for this expensive strategy enhanced the power of the state in
the West. Such power could provoke a negative reaction, but overall,
the challenge of war--if successfully met--increased the
effectiveness of the state. As Parker puts it, "states made war but
wars also made states" (p.8). But success in this respect
also depended in part upon the development of other instruments of
power, particularly the financial institutions which enabled states
to fund armies, including credit, which in turn required the
cooperation of those who supplied the credit or the means which
underpinned it. Long-term credit in wartime thus represented a
crucial "secret weapon" of the West. Not surprisingly, not all
western states stayed the course. Sweden, for example--an aggressive
and imperial power in the Baltic and north Germany in the seventeenth
century--dropped out of the race following its traumatic defeat in
the Great Northern War (1700-21). However, the West as a
block--Europe initially, subsequently joined by the United
States--had found the means, that is, the military culture, that
ensured "European'" domination of the world, and which was already
well advanced by the middle of the seventeenth century.
The rest of the book focuses on explaining these developments. Part
1, "The Age of Massed Infantry," covers the period from 600 BC to 300
AD, with chapters on the "Genesis of the Infantry, 600-350 BC" and
"The Roman Way of War 250 BC-AD 300'"; part 2, "The Age of Stone
Fortifications" (300-1500 AD) includes chapters on "New Weapons, New
Tactics 1300-1500" and "The Gunpowder Revolution 1300-1500"; part 3,
"The Age of Guns and Sails" covers the period 1500-1800/1815; and
part 4, "The Age of Mechanized Warfare" covers the period 1800-2004.
Thus, the book's coverage is extended beyond that of 1995 to include
most obviously the Al Qaeda attack on New York in September 2001,
President Bush's "war on terror"(which, curiously, given its
stretching of the nature and understanding of war, is not really
discussed), the attack on (or bombardment) of Afghanistan (2001) and
the invasion of Iraq (2003). The volume is completed by an epilogue
in which Parker briefly recapitulates the factors that distinguish
the Western way of war. He also explains the successes of this way of
war and seeks to divine future developments. Parker concludes that to
maintain its (military) dominance, the West must continue "to be
right" (p. 432). This difficult task is best done, he
argues, by imitating the traditions outlined and analyzed in this
volume, which thus is intended to function as something of a manual
for policy-makers (and their electorates?). Some additional material
is found in a chronology and in a glossary. Finally, there is a
helpful bibliography, which inevitably, however, can only scratch the
surface of the vast range of secondary literature which underpins
what is essentially a work of synthesis.
Parker has edited a very readable and interesting volume, one which
has already won widespread plaudits--for good reason. However (and
inevitably, given the ambitious attempt to cover the great sweep of
the history of war over two millennia in little more than 400 pages),
some anomalies and lacunae remain . Half of the book deals with the
2,000 years or so to 1800; the other half with the mere two hundred
years since. The nearer we get to the present day, the greater the
detail, some of which might have been sacrificed in favor of fuller
coverage of earlier periods. Thus the War of the Polish Succession
(1733-38), whose title perhaps belies its real scope and importance,
is omitted from both main text and chronology. The War of Bavarian
Succession (1778-79), and the rather more important Russo-Austrian
war in the Balkans against the Ottoman empire (1787-92), are also
missing. As for the twentieth century, the Spanish Civil War is
covered very cursorily, and nothing is said about the destruction of
Guernica by the Condor Legion, although it might be thought to have
deserved mention as representing the testing of some of the new
thinking about the use of airpower in war. Curiously, too, the
concept of _Blitzkrieg_ is nowhere mentioned. The volume also
occasionally seems to be shy of engaging with influential theorists
of war. The important early-nineteenth-century Prussian military
thinker, Carl von Clausewitz, who meditated on the recent experience
of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (and on much more)
and whose work is said to have influenced United States' commanders
in the 1980s, is mentioned, but surely merited fuller discussion.
Inevitably, individual readers will sometimes disagree with some of
the interpretation. Were dynastic issues really less dominant in
justifying war after 1640? The designation of various conflicts in
the succeeding hundred years as wars of (Spanish, Polish, Austrian)
succession may be overdone but there was some point to these labels.
Last, but by no means least, given the attention devoted to
contemporary conflicts (notably the second Iraq war), and the lack of
consensus about their justification, some will think the account,
evenhanded and objective as it clearly seeks to be, insufficiently
critical of the leaders who took their states to war.
Some readers will want more on their particular period, or war, or
aspect of military (or naval) history, and less on others.
Nevertheless, Parker and his collaborators have produced an
impressive and immensely useful survey, within which are
invaluable--not least because they are concise, clearly written and
very readable--surveys of major conflicts. In addition, the
contributions of the various authors are made to fit into a coherent
overall pattern or thesis. The volume will no doubt--and deserves
to--find a large market among those seeking among other things to set
recent conflicts, and developments in the ways of war, into
historical context.
Copyright 2006 by H-Net, all rights reserved. H-Net permits the
redistribution and reprinting of this work for nonprofit, educational
purposes, with full and accurate attribution to the author, web
location, date of publication, originating list, and H-Net: Humanities &
Social Sciences Online. For any other proposed use, contact the Reviews
editorial staff at hbooks@mail.h-net.msu.edu.
We also note that Arethusa 39.3 has hit Project Muse with a special issue on Ennius and the Invention of Roman Epic ....