H-NET BOOK REVIEW
Published by H-Italy@h-net.msu.edu (February, 2005)
Nathan Rosenstein. _Rome at War: Farms, Families and Death in the Middle
Republic_. Studies in the History of Greece and Rome. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2004. x + 339 pp. Tables, figures,
notes, bibliography, index. $45.00 (cloth), ISBN 0-8078-2839-4.
Reviewed for H-Italy by Jonathan P. Roth, Department of
History, San Jose State University.
New Perspectives on Rome's Farmer-Soldiers
_Rome at War_ is a traditional monograph, which is very much a good thing.
In this age of obfuscating postmodernizing, it is refreshing to see a
scholar challenge a generally accepted thesis, systematically and
creatively question the evidence and reason supporting it, and then
propose a more viable model. Rosenstein's work is characterized by clear
writing and an insistence on engaging all the evidence, even (in fact,
especially) that which might undermine his own thesis. More historians
need to get back to this tried and true method. However, that is not to
say _Rome at War_ is old-fashioned. The core of the argument revolves
around a sophisticated use of recent advances in demographics, and
although a background in statistics is useful, Rosenstein does an
excellent job of making the discussion clear.
The book focuses on the relationship between Rome's small holding farmers
and the increasing rate and burden of warfare in the third and second
centuries BCE. This association went both ways--the Roman military system
depended on the conscription of these farmers and, of course their
military service affected the farms themselves. The traditional view of
this relationship was that the small farmers found it more and more
difficult to survive economically because of long absences due to military
service during the Second Punic War. This led to smallholdings being
increasingly replaced by large, slave-run plantations. The reliance on
slavery supposedly made conscription more difficult, and swelled the ranks
of landless proletarians.
Archaeological evidence, primarily large-scale surveys, have thrown doubt
on this view, though such evidence is ill-suited for following economic
and social changes over a period spanning a few decades. Therefore,
Rosenstein uses contemporary demographic theory models as well as the
latest in archaeology to skillfully interpret the literary sources.
Clearly some guess work is involved in this sort of approach. For example,
casualty lists apply almost exclusively to major battles. The casualty
rate for smaller engagements and skirmishes is a mere guess, as is the
rate of death from disease. Fighting was not equal among all units--some
did not fight at all. Rosenstein's careful critique, however, raises
confidence in his method, and using numbers, as opposed to "many" or
"some," allows him to use statistical modeling to great effect. In
addition, he makes good use of comparative material throughout, drawing on
important studies of the Prussian military and of conscription in the
Confederate South, one of the only slave societies to go through the sort
of military mobilization that Rome did during the Second Punic War.
Rosenstein is scrupulous in making clear that his numbers are approximate
and generally meant to refer to the order of magnitude, but his model does
ultimately depend on the reliability of the numbers we get in ancient
sources, especially Livy. While this is, in the final analysis,
unverifiable, Rosenstein presents a powerful case that such numbers are
more reliable than is generally thought. There were accurate sources
available to the ancient historian, for example pay lists and records of
triumphs, and Rosenstein notes that Livy, despite his poor reputation, at
times seems to have been more critical of numbers than Polybius. It does
seem that especially high and low figures are the most remembered and are
over-represented in the sources, but the sort of conventional figures that
Walter Scheidel found in economic inscriptions do not appear in casualty
figures.[1] Differences in numbers reflected in our sources may have other
explanations than inaccuracy, for example they could reflect differences
in the status of casualties (citizen vs. non-citizen). One element that
comes through strongly is that we should not be hypercritical of Livy's
account of fourth and third century Rome.
The book's powerful arguments undermine the traditional explanations of
Rome's agrarian crisis. In the first place, conscription did not lead to
the abandonment of farms due to lack of labor because ancient farms
suffered from chronic over-employment and could afford to send young men
into service. A key element in Rosenstein's argument is the effect of late
marriage on Roman warfare. During the Republican period (and later) Roman
men normally married in their late twenties and early thirties to women in
their late teens. This meant that Roman men normally married, and
established farms, after their military service was over. The importance
of slave-run plantations in the second century is also analyzed.
Rosenstein advances a number of compelling critiques of the traditional
view. For example, it is clear that Rome's slave population did not grow
as rapidly as had been thought by P. A. Brunt.[2] Rome was already a slave
society before 200 B.C.E, with widespread use of slaves on relatively
small farms. Large-scale plantation slavery, however, relied on the sort
of Mediterranean wide market for Italian goods that did not exist until
the first century B.C.E. There are certainly references to enormous
numbers of slaves being brought in by second century wars (e.g. 150,000
from Epirus) but Rosenstein's in-depth analysis shows that the overall
numbers were much smaller than such passages suggest.
If the traditional view, that the economic and social problems of the late
Roman Republic are incorrect, then what does Rosenstein propose? His model
is complex and nuanced, but compelling. Rosenstein's demographic modeling
is very convincing, showing, for example, that a post-Punic War baby boom
likely occurred. He does not rely completely on modeling, however, and
always looks to both the literary and archaeological evidence, to see if
it is in congruence with his theories. He notes, for example, that many
colonies were established in the years after the Second Punic War
ended--consistent with the idea of a rising citizen population. It is not
that constant war had no effect, but that counter-intuitively, the normal
societal limits to population growth were "turned off" by the Punic Wars.
Thus there was a rapid growth of population, a post-war "baby boom" that
let to too many young men competing for too little land. The effect of
this was that smallholdings were subdivided too much to be
sustainable--thus forcing population into the cities, increasing the
proletariat. Roman writers attributed the crisis to under population
caused by conscription, but the very real rural crisis was caused by
overpopulation. Thus the Gracchan solution of distributing land was doomed
to failure; there was simply no surplus land to distribute. The problem,
Rosenstein concludes, was only solved by the massive population losses in
the Civil War and the subsequent overseas migration.
In the course of his arguments, Rosenstein makes many points important to
the military historian. His discussion of casualties and death rates is
valuable to anyone wanting to reconstruct the ancient battle. He considers
the effect of legionary armor in reducing wounds, that many diseases that
affected later armies (such as measles, plague, cholera and smallpox)
probably did not exist in Roman times. In addition, the infection rate of
wounds was lower than in gunpowder warfare. Rosenstein makes the valuable
point that the high age for men and low age of women for marriage resulted
in the Romans being able to conscript an enormous number of small-holding
farmers without negatively effecting the agricultural economy. This was a
major, if not the major, factor in thei
r imperial success. This remained
the case even when the Romans were conscripting up to 70 percent of the
free adult population for war, a number not equaled until the experience
of the Confederate States in the American Civil War.
Although the focus of the book is military history, it is also valuable
for a more general reader. In particular, the discussions of the patterns
of agriculture are illuminating. It is remarkable that so little attention
is paid to the mechanics of ancient farming, considering that it was not
only the principal activity of the vast majority of the population, but
also drove the economy of ancient states. Rosenstein is focused of this
issue for a specific reason, that is, to investigate the impact of
military conscription and service on the Roman family farm. In doing so,
however, he presents an extraordinarily clear and concise model of the
ancient farm. Students of ancient history (and others) would greatly
benefit from reading this section. Rosenstein discusses, for example,
Roman law of wills and inheritance; the agricultural calendar; and, the
point--made clearer by mathematical modeling--that ancient family
economics suffered from underemployment. Rosenstein explores other
non-military issues, for example, the ratio of marriageable men to women
in the Roman population, the types of crops planted, and the function of
both paid and unpaid labor in the ancient farm economy. Non-paid labor was
vital to the ancient farmstead and included both relatives and neighbors.
Indeed a "neighbor-helping-neighbor" labor exchange system existed, which
relied both on custom and on the exchange of gifts and services among
local farmers. Also thought provoking was the importance of public land
(_ager publicus_) to small farmers.
The traditional monograph uses appendices to present in-depth discussions
of issues relevant to the subject, but which would interfere with the flow
of the argument if included in the text. The serious student often finds
these short studies to be gems, and particularly good ones are often cited
in their own right. These appendices are generally as useful, or more so,
than short articles, and Rosenstein's are no exception. Since appendices
are not separately listed in bibliographies and databases, they are
sometimes overlooked. _Rome at War_ has seven. "The Number of Roman Slaves
in 168 B.C.," argues that the slave population at this time was smaller
than is generally assumed, namely fewer than 10 percent. "The Accuracy of
the Roman Calendar before 218 B.C.," argues that the Romans regularly
intercalated the lunar calendar to keep it in line with the seasons.
"Tenancy" is a remarkable mini-essay on the unusual nature of the
Greco-Roman citizen republic and how it effected the institution of tenant
farmers. Unlike the more normal monarchical systems of the Mediterranean
region, Rosenstein argues, there was little tenancy in Republican Rome.
"The Minimum Age for Military Service" slices through the confusion over
"inclusive counting" and shows that, for all intents and purposes, the
Romans calculated age exactly as we do. "The Proportion of _Assidui_ in
the Roman Population" shows that Brunt's estimate of only 50 percent of
the Roman adult males being _assidui_, with the rest being proletarians,
is way off. According to Rosenstein, 90 percent of Romans qualified for
military service. Here I have to take some issue--Rosenstein's figure
seems too high as Brunt's is too low. If so many qualified for service,
why even have a category of proletarians? Nevertheless, his arguments need
to be considered by anyone dealing with this issue. "The Duration of
Military Service in the Second Century B.C." is an argument that
Polybius's figure of sixteen years of service was indeed normal, as is
generally accepted, but has recently been challenged. "The Number of
Citizen Deaths as a Result of Military Service between 203 and 168 B.C."
concludes that, as a rule, generals tried to spare Roman citizens and use
Italian allies whenever possible. These appendices are truly gems of
scholarship. The reader also should not neglect to consult Rosenstein's
excellent notes, which also serve up mini-essays on important points. The
bibliography is comprehensive and up-to-date, something that cannot always
be taken for granted nowadays.
I cannot recommend this book highly enough. Rosenstein is the finest
practitioner of the "New Military History" in the United States. He shows
brilliantly in this, and his other books, the sorts of insights that a
fresh and open approach to Roman warfare can bring to all aspects of
ancient societies. I wish that more Romanists would abandon the sterile
acrobatics of postmodernism and return to the tried and true methods of
rigorous analysis and creative thinking that Rosenstein so ably practices.
While aimed at the scholar, _Rome at War_ is certainly appropriate, and
very useful, for graduate and upper division undergraduate courses.
Notes
[1]. Walter Scheidel, "Finances, Figures and Fiction," _Classical
Quarterly_ 46 (1996): pp. 222-38.
[2]. P.A. Brunt, _Italian Manpower_ (London: Oxford University Press,
1971), pp. 91-130.
Copyright 2005 by H-Net, all rights reserved. H-Net permits the
redistribution and reprinting of this work for nonprofit, educational
purposes, with full and accurate attribution to the author, web
location, date of publication, originating list, and H-Net: Humanities &
Social Sciences Online. For any other proposed use, contact the Reviews
editorial staff at hbooks@mail.h-net.msu.edu.
Published by H-Italy@h-net.msu.edu (February, 2005)
Nathan Rosenstein. _Rome at War: Farms, Families and Death in the Middle
Republic_. Studies in the History of Greece and Rome. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2004. x + 339 pp. Tables, figures,
notes, bibliography, index. $45.00 (cloth), ISBN 0-8078-2839-4.
Reviewed for H-Italy by Jonathan P. Roth, Department of
History, San Jose State University.
New Perspectives on Rome's Farmer-Soldiers
_Rome at War_ is a traditional monograph, which is very much a good thing.
In this age of obfuscating postmodernizing, it is refreshing to see a
scholar challenge a generally accepted thesis, systematically and
creatively question the evidence and reason supporting it, and then
propose a more viable model. Rosenstein's work is characterized by clear
writing and an insistence on engaging all the evidence, even (in fact,
especially) that which might undermine his own thesis. More historians
need to get back to this tried and true method. However, that is not to
say _Rome at War_ is old-fashioned. The core of the argument revolves
around a sophisticated use of recent advances in demographics, and
although a background in statistics is useful, Rosenstein does an
excellent job of making the discussion clear.
The book focuses on the relationship between Rome's small holding farmers
and the increasing rate and burden of warfare in the third and second
centuries BCE. This association went both ways--the Roman military system
depended on the conscription of these farmers and, of course their
military service affected the farms themselves. The traditional view of
this relationship was that the small farmers found it more and more
difficult to survive economically because of long absences due to military
service during the Second Punic War. This led to smallholdings being
increasingly replaced by large, slave-run plantations. The reliance on
slavery supposedly made conscription more difficult, and swelled the ranks
of landless proletarians.
Archaeological evidence, primarily large-scale surveys, have thrown doubt
on this view, though such evidence is ill-suited for following economic
and social changes over a period spanning a few decades. Therefore,
Rosenstein uses contemporary demographic theory models as well as the
latest in archaeology to skillfully interpret the literary sources.
Clearly some guess work is involved in this sort of approach. For example,
casualty lists apply almost exclusively to major battles. The casualty
rate for smaller engagements and skirmishes is a mere guess, as is the
rate of death from disease. Fighting was not equal among all units--some
did not fight at all. Rosenstein's careful critique, however, raises
confidence in his method, and using numbers, as opposed to "many" or
"some," allows him to use statistical modeling to great effect. In
addition, he makes good use of comparative material throughout, drawing on
important studies of the Prussian military and of conscription in the
Confederate South, one of the only slave societies to go through the sort
of military mobilization that Rome did during the Second Punic War.
Rosenstein is scrupulous in making clear that his numbers are approximate
and generally meant to refer to the order of magnitude, but his model does
ultimately depend on the reliability of the numbers we get in ancient
sources, especially Livy. While this is, in the final analysis,
unverifiable, Rosenstein presents a powerful case that such numbers are
more reliable than is generally thought. There were accurate sources
available to the ancient historian, for example pay lists and records of
triumphs, and Rosenstein notes that Livy, despite his poor reputation, at
times seems to have been more critical of numbers than Polybius. It does
seem that especially high and low figures are the most remembered and are
over-represented in the sources, but the sort of conventional figures that
Walter Scheidel found in economic inscriptions do not appear in casualty
figures.[1] Differences in numbers reflected in our sources may have other
explanations than inaccuracy, for example they could reflect differences
in the status of casualties (citizen vs. non-citizen). One element that
comes through strongly is that we should not be hypercritical of Livy's
account of fourth and third century Rome.
The book's powerful arguments undermine the traditional explanations of
Rome's agrarian crisis. In the first place, conscription did not lead to
the abandonment of farms due to lack of labor because ancient farms
suffered from chronic over-employment and could afford to send young men
into service. A key element in Rosenstein's argument is the effect of late
marriage on Roman warfare. During the Republican period (and later) Roman
men normally married in their late twenties and early thirties to women in
their late teens. This meant that Roman men normally married, and
established farms, after their military service was over. The importance
of slave-run plantations in the second century is also analyzed.
Rosenstein advances a number of compelling critiques of the traditional
view. For example, it is clear that Rome's slave population did not grow
as rapidly as had been thought by P. A. Brunt.[2] Rome was already a slave
society before 200 B.C.E, with widespread use of slaves on relatively
small farms. Large-scale plantation slavery, however, relied on the sort
of Mediterranean wide market for Italian goods that did not exist until
the first century B.C.E. There are certainly references to enormous
numbers of slaves being brought in by second century wars (e.g. 150,000
from Epirus) but Rosenstein's in-depth analysis shows that the overall
numbers were much smaller than such passages suggest.
If the traditional view, that the economic and social problems of the late
Roman Republic are incorrect, then what does Rosenstein propose? His model
is complex and nuanced, but compelling. Rosenstein's demographic modeling
is very convincing, showing, for example, that a post-Punic War baby boom
likely occurred. He does not rely completely on modeling, however, and
always looks to both the literary and archaeological evidence, to see if
it is in congruence with his theories. He notes, for example, that many
colonies were established in the years after the Second Punic War
ended--consistent with the idea of a rising citizen population. It is not
that constant war had no effect, but that counter-intuitively, the normal
societal limits to population growth were "turned off" by the Punic Wars.
Thus there was a rapid growth of population, a post-war "baby boom" that
let to too many young men competing for too little land. The effect of
this was that smallholdings were subdivided too much to be
sustainable--thus forcing population into the cities, increasing the
proletariat. Roman writers attributed the crisis to under population
caused by conscription, but the very real rural crisis was caused by
overpopulation. Thus the Gracchan solution of distributing land was doomed
to failure; there was simply no surplus land to distribute. The problem,
Rosenstein concludes, was only solved by the massive population losses in
the Civil War and the subsequent overseas migration.
In the course of his arguments, Rosenstein makes many points important to
the military historian. His discussion of casualties and death rates is
valuable to anyone wanting to reconstruct the ancient battle. He considers
the effect of legionary armor in reducing wounds, that many diseases that
affected later armies (such as measles, plague, cholera and smallpox)
probably did not exist in Roman times. In addition, the infection rate of
wounds was lower than in gunpowder warfare. Rosenstein makes the valuable
point that the high age for men and low age of women for marriage resulted
in the Romans being able to conscript an enormous number of small-holding
farmers without negatively effecting the agricultural economy. This was a
major, if not the major, factor in thei
r imperial success. This remained
the case even when the Romans were conscripting up to 70 percent of the
free adult population for war, a number not equaled until the experience
of the Confederate States in the American Civil War.
Although the focus of the book is military history, it is also valuable
for a more general reader. In particular, the discussions of the patterns
of agriculture are illuminating. It is remarkable that so little attention
is paid to the mechanics of ancient farming, considering that it was not
only the principal activity of the vast majority of the population, but
also drove the economy of ancient states. Rosenstein is focused of this
issue for a specific reason, that is, to investigate the impact of
military conscription and service on the Roman family farm. In doing so,
however, he presents an extraordinarily clear and concise model of the
ancient farm. Students of ancient history (and others) would greatly
benefit from reading this section. Rosenstein discusses, for example,
Roman law of wills and inheritance; the agricultural calendar; and, the
point--made clearer by mathematical modeling--that ancient family
economics suffered from underemployment. Rosenstein explores other
non-military issues, for example, the ratio of marriageable men to women
in the Roman population, the types of crops planted, and the function of
both paid and unpaid labor in the ancient farm economy. Non-paid labor was
vital to the ancient farmstead and included both relatives and neighbors.
Indeed a "neighbor-helping-neighbor" labor exchange system existed, which
relied both on custom and on the exchange of gifts and services among
local farmers. Also thought provoking was the importance of public land
(_ager publicus_) to small farmers.
The traditional monograph uses appendices to present in-depth discussions
of issues relevant to the subject, but which would interfere with the flow
of the argument if included in the text. The serious student often finds
these short studies to be gems, and particularly good ones are often cited
in their own right. These appendices are generally as useful, or more so,
than short articles, and Rosenstein's are no exception. Since appendices
are not separately listed in bibliographies and databases, they are
sometimes overlooked. _Rome at War_ has seven. "The Number of Roman Slaves
in 168 B.C.," argues that the slave population at this time was smaller
than is generally assumed, namely fewer than 10 percent. "The Accuracy of
the Roman Calendar before 218 B.C.," argues that the Romans regularly
intercalated the lunar calendar to keep it in line with the seasons.
"Tenancy" is a remarkable mini-essay on the unusual nature of the
Greco-Roman citizen republic and how it effected the institution of tenant
farmers. Unlike the more normal monarchical systems of the Mediterranean
region, Rosenstein argues, there was little tenancy in Republican Rome.
"The Minimum Age for Military Service" slices through the confusion over
"inclusive counting" and shows that, for all intents and purposes, the
Romans calculated age exactly as we do. "The Proportion of _Assidui_ in
the Roman Population" shows that Brunt's estimate of only 50 percent of
the Roman adult males being _assidui_, with the rest being proletarians,
is way off. According to Rosenstein, 90 percent of Romans qualified for
military service. Here I have to take some issue--Rosenstein's figure
seems too high as Brunt's is too low. If so many qualified for service,
why even have a category of proletarians? Nevertheless, his arguments need
to be considered by anyone dealing with this issue. "The Duration of
Military Service in the Second Century B.C." is an argument that
Polybius's figure of sixteen years of service was indeed normal, as is
generally accepted, but has recently been challenged. "The Number of
Citizen Deaths as a Result of Military Service between 203 and 168 B.C."
concludes that, as a rule, generals tried to spare Roman citizens and use
Italian allies whenever possible. These appendices are truly gems of
scholarship. The reader also should not neglect to consult Rosenstein's
excellent notes, which also serve up mini-essays on important points. The
bibliography is comprehensive and up-to-date, something that cannot always
be taken for granted nowadays.
I cannot recommend this book highly enough. Rosenstein is the finest
practitioner of the "New Military History" in the United States. He shows
brilliantly in this, and his other books, the sorts of insights that a
fresh and open approach to Roman warfare can bring to all aspects of
ancient societies. I wish that more Romanists would abandon the sterile
acrobatics of postmodernism and return to the tried and true methods of
rigorous analysis and creative thinking that Rosenstein so ably practices.
While aimed at the scholar, _Rome at War_ is certainly appropriate, and
very useful, for graduate and upper division undergraduate courses.
Notes
[1]. Walter Scheidel, "Finances, Figures and Fiction," _Classical
Quarterly_ 46 (1996): pp. 222-38.
[2]. P.A. Brunt, _Italian Manpower_ (London: Oxford University Press,
1971), pp. 91-130.
Copyright 2005 by H-Net, all rights reserved. H-Net permits the
redistribution and reprinting of this work for nonprofit, educational
purposes, with full and accurate attribution to the author, web
location, date of publication, originating list, and H-Net: Humanities &
Social Sciences Online. For any other proposed use, contact the Reviews
editorial staff at hbooks@mail.h-net.msu.edu.